Addressing High Health Care Prices: Transparency, Enforcement, and Legislation

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Nevada Patient Protection Commission






What if the price of food increased like the price of health care?







\$65




\$160

Source: Institute of Medicine, Best Care at Lower Cost: The Path to Continuously Learning Health Care in America (2013) and updated to 2019 dollars with the Federal Reserve Bank Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator.





Figure 1: Medical Prices in 2017 as a Percent of US Prices



"Prices are the **primary** reason why US spends more on health care than any other country"

- Gerard F. Anderson, Peter Hussey, and Varduhi Petrosyan, It's Still The Prices, Stupid: Why The US Spends So Much On Health Care, And A Tribute To Uwe Reinhardt, Health Affairs 38:1 (2019)



What Happened to Health Care Prices?


- Failure to protect essential elements of a free market system – price transparency and competition.
- Failure to rigorously enforce antitrust laws.
- Failure to regulate to control prices when competition no longer exists.



Failure to Protect Price Transparency

Nearly Two-Thirds Say It Is Difficult To Find Out What Medical Care Will Cost

In general, how easy or difficult would you say it is to find out how much medical treatments and procedures provided by different doctors or hospitals would cost you?





THE 2020 REPORT CARD ON STATE PRICE TRANSPARENCY LAWS



GRADE	STATES		
A	Maine New Hampshire		
В	Colorado Connecticut Maryland Massachusetts		
С	Florida Minnesota New Mexico Oregon Virginia		
D	Arkansas California Utah Vermont Washington		
F	Alabama Alaska Arizona Delaware Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Michigan Mississippi Missouri Montana	Nebraska Nevada New Jersey New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming	





Antitrust Enforcement Losses Fuel Consolidation

Table 1 Litigated Hospital Merger Cases

	Year	Case	Location	Blocked?
1	1989	United States v. Rockford Mem. Hosp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. III. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.).	Rockford, IL	Yes
2	1991	FTC v. Univ. Health, 1991-1 Trade Cases \P 69,400 (S.D. Ga.) and 1991-1 Trade Cases \P 69,444 (S.D. Ga.) $rev'd$, 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).	Augusta, GA	Yes
3	1994	In re Adventist Health Sys. (Ukiah), 117 F.T.C. 224 (1994).	Ukiah, CA	No
4	1995	FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995).	Joplin, MO	No
5	1995	United States v. Mercy Health Serv., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).	Dubuque, IA	No
6	1996	FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff'd per curiam, No. 96-2440 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997).	Grand Rapids, MI	No
7	1997	United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).	New Hyde Park, N	Y No
8	1998	FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev'd 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).	Poplar Bluff, MO	No
9	2000	California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mem., 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) U 87,665 (9th Cir. 2000), revised, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2001).	Oakland, CA	No
10	2004	In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007).	Evanston, IL	N/A
11	2008	In re Inova Health Sys. Found., No. 9326 (F.T.C. May 8, 2008).	Manassas, VA A	bandoned
12	2011	In re ProMedica Health Sys., No. 12-3583 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2014).	Toledo, OH	Yes
13	2011	FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., No 11-12906 (11th Cir. Dec. 9, 2011), <i>rev'd</i> , No. 11-1160, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 19, 2013).	Albany, GA	No
14	2012	FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 11 C 50344 (N.D. III. Apr. 5, 2012).	Rockford, IL	Yes

ITAL MERGER ENFORCEMENT

SOURCE: Author's review of hospital merger cases. Inova abandoned its proposed acquisition after the FTC filed suit to block the deal.

Healthcare Merger | Mania











Healthcare Merger Mania



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Horizontal (Part 1) Cross-M

- Increased Prices: Post-merger hospital prices increased 20-44% (Dafny, 2009; Haas-Wilson & Garmon, 2011; Tenn, 2011; Gaynor & Town, 2012)
- Reduced Quality: Hospital acquisition associated with modestly worse patient experiences or reduced quality (Gaynor et al. 2013; Koch et al. 2018; Short and Ho 2019; Beaulieu, Dafny, et al., 2020)
 - California hospital mergers associated with higher inpatient mortality rates among heart disease patients (Hayford, 2011)

Healthcare Merger Mania







Horizontal (Part 2)

- **Increased Premiums:** Higher hospital concentration associated with higher ACA premiums (Boozary, et al., 2019)
- Reduced Wage Growth: Hospital mergers reduced wage growth by 6.3% for nurses and pharmacists (Prager and Schmitt, 2019)
- **Higher Costs**: Hospitals in larger systems have higher operating costs than hospitals in smaller systems (Burns et al., 2015)

Healthcare Merger | Mania







Vertical

- Higher Physician Prices: Physician prices increase post-merger by an average of 14% (Capps, Dranove, & Ody, 2018)
 - Cardiologist prices increased by 33.5% (Id.)
 - Orthopedist prices increased by 12-20% (Koch and Ulrick, 2017)arket
- Higher Clinic Prices: Hospital-acquired clinic prices increased 32–47% within four years (Carlin, Feldman & Dowd, 2017)
- Higher Hospital Prices (Baker, Bundorf, Kessler, 2014)
- Little to no quality improvements (McWilliams et al. 2013; Neprash et al. 2015; Short and Ho, 2019)
- Unlikely to trigger federal antitrust review

Healthcare Merger Mania



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Cross-Market

Rising number of cross-market mergers

Increased Prices: 7-17% increases in prices for independent hospitals purchased by out-of-market systems (Lewis & Pflum, 2016; Dafny, Ho, & Lee 2019)

Increased Competing Hospital Prices: Price increases by 7.8% in nearby rival hospitals (Lewis & Pflum, 2016)






Cross-Market



Health Care Consolidation

Figure 1: Healthcare Market Concentration Levels 2010-2018




Source: Nicholas C. Petris Center on Health Care Markets and Consumer Welfare (<u>petris.org</u>), University of California, Berkeley, analysis of data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey, SK&A Office Based Physicians Database from IQVIA, and Managed Market Surveyor File from <u>HealthLeaders InterStudy</u> (Decision Resources Group).



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Figure 8: Reno and Las Vegas Percent of Primary Care Physicians in Practices Owned by Hospitals/Health Systems, 2010-2018



Source: Authors' analysis of data from SKA's Office-Based Physicians Database.

Notes: MSA-level measures. Only cardiologists, hematologists/oncologists, orthopedists, and radiologists are included.

Reno = Reno, NV MSA



Inpatient Hospital Market Concentration in U.S. Metros, 2017 2017

Concentration Level 1

UNCONCENTRATED

MODERATE

HIGH


VERY HIGH

Las Vegas, NV

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV

2017 HHI Change since 2013

2,736 +110




Reno, NV

Reno, NV

2017 HHI Change since 2013

4,663 +353




Salt Lake City, UT

Salt Lake City, UT

2017 HHI Change since 2013

4,864 -758




Phoenix, AZ

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ

2017 HHI Change since 2013

2,924 +237



Compare Health Care Price Levels and Growth in Select U.S. Metros



OVERALL

NEATIENT

TESTENT

PROFESSIONAL

Las Vegas, NV

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV

Price level Price Growth

10% above +21% since 2013

-80% Nat'l Median +80%

Reno, NV

Reno, NV



Salt Lake City, UT


Salt Lake City, UT





Phoenix, AZ


Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ












40%



Compare Health Care Prices, Use Levels and Growth in Select Metros

OVERALL IMPATIENT QUITPATIENT PROFESSIONAL





Compare Health Care Price Levels and Growth in Select U.S. Metros

Service Category 1

VERALL INPATIENT

OUTPATER

PROFESSIONAL

Las Vegas, NV

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV

Price level Price Growth

19% above +26% since 2013

-80% Nat'l Median +80%

Reno, NV

nat'l median 2017

Reno, NV

Price level Price Growth

8% below +6%



since 2013

Salt Lake City, UT

Salt Lake City, UT

Price level Price Growth

2% below
nat'l median 2017 since 2013




Phoenix, AZ


Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ


Price level Price Growth


1% below
nat'l median 2017 since 2013













Compare Health Care Price Levels and Growth in Select U.S. Metros

Service Category 1

OVERALL

VPATIENT.

OUTPATIENT

PROFESSIONAL

Las Vegas, NV

Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV

Price level Price Growth 35% above +32%

nat'l median 2017 since 2013



Reno, NV

Reno, NV





Salt Lake City, UT

Salt Lake City, UT







Phoenix, AZ


Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ



















Figure 3: Reno and Las Vegas Average Price of an Emergency Room Visit (Level 5), 2008-2017



Source: Authors' analysis of data from the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI)'s outpatient claims database.

Notes: Emergency Room Visit (Level 5) corresponds to CPT Code 99825. CPT Code 99825 was the third most common emergency room service (# claims = 934) provided in Reno in 2017 according to HCCI data. The minimum number of claims used to calculate a data point was 152.



What can be done?


- Get the data.
- Enhance antitrust enforcement.
- Pass legislation to support competition and address market deficiencies.



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Create an All Payer Claims Database

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Nevada

Nevada introduced SB472 to establish an APCD in March 2019.

Category

Strong Interest

More Information



Uses for All Payer Claims Database Data

Consumers

- Inform selection of "shoppable" health care services
- Promote comparison of health plans and providers

Policy and Enforcement

Provide accurate information on functioning of health care markets

- Inform merger analysis and review
- Identify the drivers of cost and track prices post consolidation
- Track utilization and price trends
- Identify low value services
- Inform policy goals and monitor policy initiatives
- Facilitate analysis of price variation
- Establish benchmark pricing





State Statutory Authority

Provider Merger Insurance Merger

Statutory Requirement for State Insurance Commissioner Review: Click to sort by Requirements

State	Notice Required Prior to Merger	Approval Required for Merger Involving Insurer	Approval Standard: Hazardous to Public Interest	Approval Standard: "Substantially Lessen Competition"	Approval Standard: Quantitative Competitive Standard
Michigan	0	0	0	U	
Minnesota	•	•	•		0
Mississippi			•		0
Missouri	•	•	•		
Montana			•		_
Nebraska	0	0	0	0	_
Nevada	•	•	•	•	0
New Hampshire	•		0		
New Jersey					
NI NA!					



- Domestic and Nondomestic
- Domestic and All Health Plans
- Domestic Only
- Nondomestic Only
- None





State Statutory Authority

Provider Merger Insurance Merger

Statutory Requirement for State Attorney General Review: Click to sort by Requirements

State	Pre-Merger Notice Required	Approval of Merger Required	Review of Health Access, Pricing, or Competition Required
Mississippi	_	_	_
Missouri	0	_	_
Montana	0		_
Nebraska	0	0	
Nevada	_	<u> </u>	_
New Hampshire	0	_	0
New Jersey	0	_	_
New Mexico	_	_	_
New York			_
North Carolina		_	_

- Download data
- All Hospitals and Physician Groups
- All Hospitals
- All Hospitals, Merger is Approved if AG Does Not Act
- Nonprofit Hospitals (Acquisition, Merger, or Conversion)
- Limited Review of Nonprofit Hospitals; AG or Court May Decide
- None

Notice	Review	Approval and Conditions	Post Transaction Monitoring
Broad Scope of Entities (all providers - hospitals, physicians, clinics, laboratories, etc)	Substantive Review Criteria - Competition - Affordability and Prices - Access - Fiduciary Duty - Public Interest	Require Pre- Transaction Approval Can be tacit or actual depending on Tiered Level	Independent Monitors Paid for by merging entities
Broad Scope of Transactions (mergers, affiliations, "any material change"	Tiered Level of Review Depending on level of antitrust risk and size of transaction	Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions	Require Annual Compliance Reports
Multiple State Entities should receive notice	Independent Consultants		
Waiting Period	Subpoena Power		



Legislative Options

Legislation Type

Examples

Address Specific Market Imperfections

Most Favored Nations Prohibitions
Surprise Billing Laws
Anti-Steering Prohibitions

Improve Market Function

Price Transparency Laws/APCDs Enhance Merger Review

Market Regulation

Rate Review Rate Caps Public Option Single Payer



Takeaways

(1) Increasing consolidation has led to higher healthcare prices in Nevada.

(2) Increased transparency initiatives can inform and improve policy choices.

(3) Increased merger review and oversight can help limit further consolidation.



Thank You!

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